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STATElVIENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of The Case 
The Plaintiff/ Appellant ("Workman"), a pro se incarcerated inmate, appeals the District 
Court's Order on Appeal ("Order") affirming the magistrate's decision to grant the motions to 
dismiss/for summary judgment filed by Defendant/Respondent Christopher Rich, Ada County Clerk 
("Rich"), and Defendant/Respondent Idaho Department of Correction ("IDOC"). In essence, 
Workman argued the garnishments made by IDOC pursuant to LC. § 20-209H were illegal as his 
restitution was no longer "still owing" as the restitution order was a civil judgment, and as such had 
expired by operation of Idaho Code§§ 10-1110 and 10-1111. (R., p.321). The Magistrate Court 
granted Rich and IDOC's motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), or alternatively Rule 56(c), 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. (R., pp.199-215). The facts of the case are not in dispute in 
this appeal. At issue on appeal are matters oflaw. 
Statement of Undisputed Facts 
Workman is presently incarcerated within the IDOC by virtue of a judgment of conviction 
and order of commitment arising out of his guilty plea to aggravated driving under the influence in 
Ada County, Idaho. The Idaho Supreme Court described the facts underlying his criminal 
conviction: 
In 2001, Workman drove his vehicle off Interstate 84 and into two pickup trucks 
parked on the side of the road. At the time of the crash, Workman was under the 
influence of heroin, methamphetamine and THC. The owners of the trucks were 
standing between the vehicles at the time of the crash, and both suffered serious 
injuries. One person was thrown into the road and suffered major broken bones and 
a ruptured spleen. The other person was pinned between the vehicles, breaking one 
leg while the other was severed from his body. 
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518,521, 164 P.3d 798,801 (2007). 
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Following entry of the judgment of conviction, the trial court entered an order for restitution on 
April 28, 2003. (R., pp.81-82). Workman was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of 
$32,391.44, pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-5304. The Order for Restitution and Civil Judgment 
("Restitution Order") stated, "FURTHER, this order shall constitute a Civil Judgment against the 
defendant, KENNETH M. WORKMAN." (R., p.82). 
IDOC began deducting funds from Workman's inmate account on September 30, 2003. (R., 
p.78). These deductions from Workman's inmate account have continued, with a total of 33 
deductions being made between September 30, 2005, and February 9, 2016. (R., pp.78-79). These 
funds were sent to the clerk of the district court in which Workman was convicted (R., p.78), in this 
case Defendant Rich, for distribution to the victims identified by the trial court. 
Procedural History 
Respondent IDOC does not dispute the procedural history set forth in Section LB. of the 
Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief'), with the following exceptions: the Supplemental 
Declaration of Kenneth "Mike'' Workman was filed on April 15, 2016; the reply memoranda 
filed by Rich on March 25, 2016, and IDOC on April 22, 2016, which were omitted from the 
Appellant's Brief; Workman filed his Notice of Appeal on June 13, 2016, which was omitted 
from Appellant's Brief; and the District Court filed his Opinion on Appeal on November 16, 
2016. Appellant's Brief, pp.1-4. 




Workman has asserted one issue on appeal as follows: 
Do restitution orders imposed under I.C. § 19-5403 constitute civil money judgments 
which must be timely renewed or become expired, unenforceable, uncollectable and no 
longer still owing? 
Appellant's Brief, p.5. 
IDOC wishes to rephrase the issue as follows: 
Should this Court affirm the District Court's Opinion on Appeal as the Court correctly 
determined that Idaho permits collection of orders of restitution separate and aside from 
the collection provisions set forth in Idaho Code § § 10-1110 and 10-1111, and 




Workman erroneously contends, as he has throughout these proceedings, "At issue in this 
appeal is the question of whether the same doctrine[, unenforceability of an expired civil money 
judgment,] applies to restitution orders - the same restitution orders that Idaho's appellate courts 
have repeatedly held are essentially civil judgments .... " Appellant's Brief, p.8. Contrary to this 
assertion, under Idaho law, restitution orders are not just civil judgments subject to the collection 
mechanisms set forth in Idaho Code § § 10-1110 and 10-1111. Rather, Idaho law permits 
collection of restitution by victims of crime, through the exercise of civil collection efforts, or by 
the Court through other efforts. Because IDOC has the authority, and the obligation, to garnish 
Workman's inmate account to remit funds to the district court, I.C. § 29-209H, the District Court 
correctly affirmed the Magistrate Court's decision to dismiss Workman's civil complaint. 
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B. Standard of Review 
Idaho's appellate courts have identified the standard of review to be applied on appeal 
from a decision of the district court rendered in its appellate capacity: 
We directly review decisions by the district court, rendered in its appellate 
capacity. We examine the magistrate record for substantial and competent 
evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and to determine whether the 
magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. If those findings are 
so supp.orted and the conclusions flow therefrom, and if the district court affirmed 
the magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court as a matter of procedure. 
State v. Hudson, 147 Idaho 335, 337, 209 P.3d 196, 198 (Ct.App. 2009) (citing State v. DeWitt, 
145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct.App. 2008)). "The interpretation of a statute is a 
question oflaw over which this Court exercises free review." Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 63-
64, 294 P.3d 184, 189-90 (2013) (quoting New Phase Invs., LLC v. Jarvis, 153 Idaho 207, 209, 
280 P.3d 710, 712 (2012)). 
C. Because the District Court Correctly Determined that Idaho Law Authorizes the IDOC to 
Garnish an Incarcerated Offender's Restitution Obligation and Remit the Same to the 
Clerk of the District Court in which Said Offender was Sentenced, This Court Should 
Affirm the District Court's Order on Appeal. 
In his Complaint, Workman claimed that, pursuant to Idaho Code § § 10-1110 and 10-
1111, a judgment must be renewed within five (5) years to remain enforceable. 1 (R., p.9). 
Therefore, the Restitution Order entered against him expired on April 28, 2008, as it had not 
been renewed. (R., p.9). Finally, Workman contends the IDOC illegally garnished funds from his 
inmate account. 
Before the magistrate, Rich and IDOC argued Workman failed to distinguish between a 
criminal restitution order and a civil judgment. (R., pp.53, 75). Rich and IDOC have repeatedly 
1 Idaho Code § 10-1110 was amended during the 2015 Legislative Session to specify a lien from an order of 
restitution continues for twenty (20) years. See 2015 Session Laws, ch. 139, § 1 and ch. 278, § 4. Idaho Code§ 10-
1111 was amended during the 2016 Legislative Session to extend the time to continue a renewed judgment from five 
(5) years to ten (10) years. See 2016 Session Laws, ch. 269, § 1. These amendments do not impact this case. 
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reiterated that just because the victim of a crime may file the restitution order as a civil judgment, 
and pursue civil collection efforts, does not mean "all restitution orders are civil judgments." (R., 
pp.55; 75; 275; 291-293). 
In reaching its decision, the Magistrate Court reviewed Idaho Code §§ 19-5304(4), 19-
5305, 19-4708, and 20-209H, and found restitution may be paid to the victim by court order 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-5304 or by a civil judgment pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-5305(1). 
(R., pp.213-214). The magistrate specifically found Workman's reliance on Idaho Code §§ 10-
1110 and 10-1111 was not "applicable to the situation here, which involves a court order of 
restitution being utilized as a basis for garnishing a portion of his prisoner account, not the 
execution of a civil judgment." (R., p.213, n.20). 
The District Court reviewed the magistrate's order, considered Workman's arguments, 
and rejected them. The District Court concluded, "[T]he restitution statute is silent concerning 
the expiration of an order of restitution, rather, stating it 'shall be due and owing at the time of 
sentencing or at the date the amount ofrestitution is determined, whichever is later."' (R., p.319). 
The District Court also stated, "[N]one of [the cases cited by Workman] hold that all restitution 
orders are civil judgments and none of them hold that all restitution orders are civil judgments 
that must be renewed or they become uncollectible or unenforceable." (R., p.320). Finally, the 
District Court held, "This Court agrees with the magistrate that neither I. C. § § 10-1110 nor 10-
1111 are applicable." (R., p.321 ). 
~---------------~· 
The District Court's decision affirming the magistrate court's interpretation and 
application of the relevant statutes was not in error. The two avenues by which restitution may be 
collected, set forth in Idaho Code §§ 19-4708, 19-5305 and 20-209H and identified by the 
Magistrate Court, are not mutually exclusive. As explained by the magistrate, simply because an 
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order for restitution may also be recorded as a civil judgment does not mean the court order 
becomes unenforceable and only the civil judgment may be pursued. (R., p.214). Yet, Workman 
continues to erroneously claim that Idaho Code §§ 10-1110 and 10-1111 are applicable because a 
court order of restitution in a criminal case is essentially a civil judgment, and solely enforceable 
as such. Appellant's Brief, pp.8-11. 
Workman implicitly admits the function of collecting restitution is left either to the 
victim or the clerk of the court. Appellant's Brief, p.16. However, he fails to recognize the victim 
and the clerk of the court have different mechanisms governed by separate and distinct processes 
set forth in statute through which collection efforts may be undertaken. As the Magistrate Court 
determined, and the District Court affirmed, the reliance on the court order of restitution by the 
clerk of the court and IDOC to collect restitution does not invoke the procedures set forth in 
Idaho Code § § 10-1110 or 10-1111. The legislature specifically established separate avenues by 
which the clerk of the court and the victim may collect restitution that is owed. See State v. 
Weaver, 158 Idaho 167, 172, 345 P.3d 226, 231 (Ct.App. 2014) (the function of enforcing a 
restitution order is "specifically entrusted" to the victim pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-5305(1) or 
the clerk of the court pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-5305(2)). 
Idaho Code § 19-5305(1) allows the victim to "execute as provided by law for civil 
judgments." See State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387, 397, 271 P.3d 1243, 1253 (Ct.App. 2012) 
("[T]he victim may enforce the restitution award like any civil judgment, outside and 
independent of the criminal court'\ Idaho Code§ 19-5305(2) provides the clerk of the court may 
collect restitution on behalf of the victim as provided in Idaho Code§ 19-4708. The clerk of the 
court was not the victim in the underlying criminal case and therefore is not bound by Idaho 
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Code § 19-5305(1).2 The fact that Idaho's statutory scheme provides two mechanisms for 
enforcement of restitution orders imposed in criminal cases is not unique to restitution orders. 
See, e.g., Grazer, 154 Idaho at 64, 294 P.3d at 190 ("A foreign-judgment creditor holding a 
judgment from a sister state or federal court may domesticate the judgment in Idaho in two ways: 
by pursuing an action on the judgment, or by filing it in Idaho pursuant to the [Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments Act]"). Idaho's legislature clearly decided that restitution to victims of 
criminal offenses should be fully compensated. Furthermore, restitution is just different than 
other civil debts and judgments. See State v. Hamilton, 129 Idaho 938, 943, 935 P.2d 201, 206 
(Ct.App. 1997) (a restitution order is part of a criminal judgment and not simply the creation of a 
debt, so it is not affected by a bankruptcy); State v. Breeden, 129 Idaho 813, 815-816, 932 P.2d 
936, 938-939 (Ct.App. 1997) (restitution orders assist victims collect monies owed them, but 
also serve other purposes of sentencing - protecting public safety by providing consequences for 
an offender's criminal conduct, forcing the offender to take responsibility for the harm he 
caused, and deterring the offender and others by "exacting a 'price' for the crime"). 
Unlike the requirements imposed on creditors seeking to enforce civil judgments, neither 
Idaho Code §§ 19-4708 nor 19-5305(2) requires the clerk of the court to take any steps to 
execute the restitution order entered as a result of criminal conduct. Instead, any collection 
efforts by the clerk of the court are to be undertaken in the same manner or fashion as other 
"debts owed to courts" as provided in Idaho Code§ 19-4708. See I.C. § 19-5305(2). The recently 
enacted Idaho Code § 20-209H, which authorizes the IDOC to garnish 20% of funds in an 
inmate's trust account to be paid to the clerk of the court for restitution, provides the clerk of the 
2 Idaho Code § 19-5306(5)(a) defines "victim" as "an individual who suffers direct or threatened physical, financial 
or emotional harm as a result of the commission of a crime or juvenile offense." 
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court with another avenue to collect restitution on behalf of the victim. 3 These statutes support 
the District Court's conclusion that the execution processes for civil judgments, which the 
victims would have to follow if they chose to pursue civil collection efforts on their own, are not 
applicable to the clerk of the court when collecting restitution pursuant to an order for restitution. 
Idaho Code § 20-209H only requires that restitution be ordered pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-
5304 and, like Idaho Code§ 19-4708, that debt must still be owing. 
It is undisputed that Workman has not satisfied his obligation to pay the restitution in full, 
The restitution and restitution-specific collection statutes do not impose any time restrictions on 
the clerk of the court or the IDOC to fulfill the statutory obligations imposed therein. See 
Weaver, 158 Idaho at 172, 345 P.3d at 231 (holding the clerk of the district court is authorized to 
determine how and when a restitution order is collected). Further, to allow the clerk of the court 
to collect restitution on behalf of the victim in the same manner as other debts owed to the court 
supports the long-standing policy of "favoring full compensation to crime victims who suffer 
economic loss" and to "obviate the need for victims to incur the cost and inconvenience of a 
separate civil action in order to gain compensation for their losses." Cottrell, 152 Idaho at 397, 
271 P.3d at 1543 (citations omitted). 
The statutory language ofldaho Code§§ 19-5304(4), 19-5305, 19-4708, and 20-209H is 
not ambiguous. Workman has not provided any legal basis to conclude the District Court 
improperly interpreted or applied these statutes to the issue before it. W orlanan does not provide 
any argument that the District Court's interpretation of the the statutes based upon the plain, 
usual and ordinary meaning of the words used produced a "palpably absurd" result. Twin Lakes 
Canal Co. v. Choules, 151 Idaho 214, 219-220, 254 P.3d 1210, 1215-1216 (2011). The statutes 
3 Idaho Code§ 20-209H was added during the 2014 Legislative Session and was effective March 1, 2015. See 2014 
Session Laws, ch. 150, § 6. 
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governing the collection efforts by the clerk of the court pursuant to a court order of restitution 
unambiguously do not require the clerk of the court or the IDOC to utilize the execution methods 
for civil judgments, including any requirement to renew said Restitution Order. 
Additionally, Workman misapprehends the nature of his financial obligation. Workman 
has made little inroad into compensating the two victims to whom he caused great harm due to 
his criminal conduct. He seeks to relieve himself of his responsibilities by focusing on alleged 
deficits in the victims' and Rich's actions rather than his criminal acts which resulted in 
significant harm and financial loss. Furthermore, even if a lien to enforce restitution was 
required, and said lien expired, the judgment itself would not have expired. Grazer, 154 Idaho 
58, 65 294, P.3d 184, 191 (2013) (citing G & R Petroleum, Inc. v. Clements, 1127 Idaho 199, 
121,898 P.2d 50, 52 (1995)) (emphasis added). The mechanism of a judgment lien is "purely the 
creation of the statute. Such a lien did not exist at common law." Platts v. Pacific First Federal 
Savings & Loan Ass'n of Tacoma, 62 Idaho 340, _, 111 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1941). "Expiration 
of the lien of a judgment does not extinguish the judgment. It simply terminates the statutory 
security." Id. at 1096. The relevance - title will not be quieted "unless the debt is paid, even 
though the mortgage could not be affirmatively enforced." Id. (Givens, J. concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). "There can be a debt without a lien but there can be no lien without a debt, 
because the lien is merely to secure or enforce payment, perforce payment of the debt." Id. at 
1097 (Givens, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). Based on these long-standing 
principles, Workman's financial obligation to his victims continues-there can be no dispute that 
his restitution obligation is "still owing" as required by Idaho Code§§ 19-4708 and 20-209H. 
For the first time on appeal, Workman appears to argue that Idaho Code §§ 19-4708 and 
19-5305(2) do not apply to him and his restitution order because the statutes were amended in 
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2009 to clarify 1) that the clerk could take action to collect restitution on behalf of victims, and 
2) that restitution is a debt owed to the court. Appellant's Brief, p. l 6. This Court should disregard 
Workman's argument raised for the first time in this appeal. Idaho appellate courts will not 
consider on appeal issues that were not presented to the trial court. Breeden, 129 Idaho at 816, 
932 P2d at 939 (citing State v. Russell, 122 Idaho 488,490, 835 P.2d 1299, 1301 (1992); State v. 
Dorsey, 126 Idaho 659, 662, 889 P.2d 93, 96 (Ct.App. 1995); State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 
117, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Ct.App. 1991)). Furthermore, to the extent that Workman contends 
that application of these statutory enforcement mechanisms to his ongoing financial obligations 
violates some sort of ex post facto prohibition, his argument fails. 
In addressing application of the ex post facto prohibition, the Idaho Supreme Court 
stated, "In order to determine whether a law is penal in nature for purposes of ex post facto 
analysis, this Court must conduct a two-part inquiry. First, we determine whether the legislature 
has indicated, either expressly or impliedly, a preference for the statute to be labeled civil or 
criminal. 'Second, where [ the legislature] has indicated an intention to establish a [ civil 
regulatory scheme], [the court] inquires further whether the statutory scheme [is] so punitive 
either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention."' Wheeler v. Idaho Dep 't of Health & 
Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 262, 207 P.3d 988, 993 (2009) (citations omitted). The collection 
mechanisms set forth in Idaho Code §§ 19-4708, 19-5305(2) and 20-209H clearly do not invoke 
criminal jurisprudence to enforce restitution orders. Rather, they involve collection of an on-
going financial responsibility flowing from criminal conduct. Even if the procedures are new, 
nothing proscribes the legislature's ability to create additional enforcement mechanisms to 
collect on a valid debt. Arguably, the legislature, recognizing that the victim's rights act clearly 
provided the court with authority to impose restitution liability and that courts have 
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"constitutional, statutory and inherent authority to compel obedience with their lawful orders", In 
re Weick, 142 Idaho 275,278, 127 P.3d 178, 181 (2005), decided to provide an explicit statutory 
procedure for the court to enforce said orders. The legislature complied with its clearly 
appropriate constitutional authority. For these reasons, Workman's claim that the statutory 
modifications do not apply to him fails. 
CONCLUSION 
The Magistrate Court correctly concluded the collection efforts by Rich and the IDOC 
pursuant to the restitution order entered against Workman are not governed by the execution 
processes as provided by law for civil judgments, including the requirement to renew the judgment 
under Idaho Code § § 10-1110 and 10-1111. The District Court correctly affirmed the magistrate's 
dismissal of the Workman's civil complaint against IDOC because IDOC had statutory authority 
to collect funds from Workman's inmate account and remit them to Rich, the Clerk of the 
District Court in and for Ada County, who had the responsibility to pay the same to the victims 
of Workman's crime. Accordingly, IDOC respectfully requests that the Court affirm the District 
Court's Order on Appeal. 
DATED this 23rd day of June 2017. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE TTORNEY G NERAL 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of June 2017, I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Respondent IDOC's Brie/by the following method to: 
Kenneth M. Workman, #61342 
ISCI 
P.O. Box 14 
Boise, Idaho 83 707 
Ray J. Chacko, Deputy Prosecutor 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Counsel for Defendant Rich 
[2J U.S. Mail/Inmate Mail Service 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
[2J U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
[2J Email to prchacri@adaweb.net 
D Facsimile: (208) 287-7719 
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